Learning from one's friends is a key process by which consumers become informed about available products. This paper embeds social learning in a model of …rms producing di¤erentiated products. We consider how the structure of social relationships between consumers in ‡uence pricing and welfare. The model is very tractable and allows us to consider how a variety of characteristics of the social network -distribution of friendships, homophily, clustering, and correlations between an individual's preferences and number of friends -in ‡uence these outcomes. It also serves to highlight the challenges one faces in using metrics such as consumer awareness and the sensitivity of demand to prices as measures of informational e¢ ciency in markets.
Introduction
An important aspect of competition in di¤erentiated product markets is how informed consumers are about their available choices. Furthermore, a lack of information by consumers is commonly identi…ed as an important source of ine¢ ciency in markets, and information provision policies are often used to ameliorate it. 1 Learning from one's friends is often one of the most signi…cant sources of information for consumers in making purchase decisions. 2 The objective of this paper is to study the role that social learning, through a social network, plays in determining the nature of competition between …rms and the welfare of participants in a di¤erentiated product market. 3 We develop a model of di¤erentiated Bertrand competition, on a circle, where awareness about each …rm's product di¤uses through friendships. An individual becomes aware of a product if a friend has previously purchased it. Our baseline model with two …rms is very tractable, allowing one to derive analytically solutions for how a wide range of network characteristics a¤ect pricing and welfare. The results also highlight challenges for identifying more or less informationally e¢ cient markets using surveys of consumers'awareness of products or estimates of the sensitivity of demand to the own or cross price. These metrics may move in a counterintuitive manner when the social network is changed. For instance, consumers may be aware of fewer products on average, yet the market may be more e¢ cient.
In the baseline model with two …rms, consumers are uniformly located around a circle and the …rms are located opposite one another. A unit mass of consumers must choose a product to purchase. We assume that the individuals learn about the available products from a second mass of individuals who have previously purchased one or other of the products. A product is in a consumer's choice set if they have a friend who purchased that product. The intensity of price competition is determined by the prevalence of consumers who are aware of both products and may therefore respond to a change in price by either …rm. In a symmetric equilibrium, these will be individuals who are located equidistant from either …rm and …nd out about the existence of both …rms from their friends. The social network in ‡uences price competition through its a¤ect on the probability that a marginal consumer will …nd out about both products. In our model, ine¢ ciencies arise due to individuals not buying from the …rm located closest to themselves. The welfare loss from buying from the "wrong" …rm is largest for individuals located close to one of the …rms. Hence, the social network in ‡uences welfare through the likelihood that individuals get information about the …rm that is closest to their location. Our analysis …nds the characteristics of social networks that in ‡uence prices and welfare through these channels.
We …nd that increasing the number of friendships reduces prices and improves welfare, while a mean preserving spread in the distribution of friendships will increase prices and reduce welfare. When individuals are more likely to be friends with people who have similar preferences for the products then, in the two-…rm case, prices are una¤ected but welfare is improved; however, once we move to three …rms, the change in prices is ambiguous but welfare is once again improved. We consider two di¤erent ways in which correlation between a consumer's preferences for the products and their number of friends may in ‡uence prices and welfare. First, we show that if marginal consumers are more likely to have more friends, then prices will decrease but welfare will be lower. Second, we show that when consumers who are located closer to one of the …rms are more likely to have more friends, then that …rm will charge a higher price and capture a larger share of the market. We show that welfare will also be lower than in the case where there is no correlation because of the asymmetric pricing outcome, which leads some consumers to purchase from the …rm that charges a lower price but is located further away. Finally, as the number of …rms is increased, prices and pro…ts decrease; however, in the limit of a large number of …rms prices are bounded away from marginal costs.
We also consider how two common measures of how well informed consumers are, average awareness of products and sensitivity of demand to price, are related to welfare. Intuitively these measures will be positively correlated with the e¢ ciency of consumer decision making. However we …nd that this need not be the case when comparing two markets. When comparing across markets with di¤erent levels of homophily, the market with lower consumer awareness will be the more e¢ cient market. Also, when comparing two markets with di¤erent correlations between an individual's number of friends and preference for the products, a market where demand is more sensitive to prices may be less e¢ cient than a market where demand is less sensitive. These results highlight some of the challenges of using these simple metrics to compare markets without more detailed information about the network structure that facilitates learning.
Related Literature
We believe that this paper is the …rst to characterize how features of a social network in ‡uence welfare and price competition in a di¤erentiated products market. The paper is related broadly to a large body of literature in industrial organization which studies settings where consumers are less than fully informed about the available products and/or prices. The literature has considered a variety of ways that …rms provide or hide information and consumers gain access to information. On the supply side, a large literature considers the incentives of …rms to undertake costly advertising (see Bagwell (2007) for an excellent review of this literature). 4 On the demand side, a signi…cant literature has focused on the incentives for consumers to undertake costly searches to learn about the products/prices themselves (for instance, Stahl (1989) and Wolinsky (1986)). 5 The e¤ect of social learning 4 Other actions that …rms strategically use include obfuscating information (Ellison and Ellison (2009) , Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) ), limiting comparability (Piccone and Spiegler), utilizing framing e¤ects (Spiegler (2014) ), and changing prices over time as consumers learn through experience (Bergemann and Välimäki (2006) ). 5 Other types of consumer behavior that have received attention include how stochastic dynamics of consumer switching in ‡uence competition (Sutton (1980)), naivete (Heidhues and Koszegi (2014) , overcon…dence (Grubb (2009) ) and how rules of thumb and behavioral biases in ‡uence on competition has received far less attention. We will discuss brie ‡y some of the closest papers which model (or can be interpreted as models of) social learning by consumers.
In the context of more than a single …rm, Galeotti (2010) develops a model of consumer search where consumers choose between searching directly for a product and searching amongst their friends, who may have searched directly themselves. The author shows how equilibrium pricing and welfare is determined by the relative costs of searching via each method. Bergemann and Välimäki (2006) study dynamic pricing of an experience good. In their context, social learning leads consumers to be less willing to experiment but for a …rm to be more willing to subsidize experimentation through a lower initial price. Smallwood and Conlisk (1979) study how market shares in ‡uence quality provision and the long-run adoption by a population of consumers who use rules of thumb for selecting a new product after a breakdown of their previously preferred product. As they note, some rules of thumb correspond to sampling the population and mimicking the behavior of others. Our model and these other models share the characteristic that individuals (at least in part) receive information about their available choices from other consumers. However, our analysis is distinct from these others in considering how the characteristics of the social network, which facilitates this transmission of information, a¤ect pricing and welfare. Goyal and Kearns (2014) consider competition between two players/…rms to seed a network prior to a subsequent di¤usion. Their focus is on how the dynamics of di¤usion a¤ect the ine¢ ciency of resource use in equilibrium and how it may amplify initial di¤erences in the budgets of the …rms. It shares the similarity with the current paper that two entities are competing in the presence of a di¤usion; however, our focus on di¤erentiated Bertrand competition and the ine¢ ciencies that arise from choosing the "wrong" product, is distinct.
Aside from models of social learning, a closely related paper is Grossman and Shapiro (1984) , which considers the price and advertising equilibrium of …rms located on a circle. Their model shares the similarity that consumers are less than fully informed about the available choices and the non-local nature of competition between …rms. Their focus is on how informative advertising a¤ects pricing and welfare in this context, whereas our focus is on how a social learning mechanism in ‡uences these quantities.
Model
There are two …rms selling a horizontally di¤erentiated product. There is a mass 1 of consumers uniformly distributed on a circle (circumference 2) where we denote a consumer's position on the circle by y 2 [ 1; 1] and the shortest distance to the price competition (Spiegler (2006) ) and product quality (Smallwood and Conlisk (1979) ).
representative …rm (w.l.o.g. let this be …rm 1 located at y = 0) by x = jyj. 6 The …rms are located opposite each other on the circle. We assume that a consumer receives utility V tx from purchasing the product from the representative …rm and V t (1 x) from purchasing the product from the other …rm.
Consumers are connected, through friendships, to a unit mass of individuals also uniformly distributed around the circle. These individuals have previously purchased one of the products. We describe the set of social connections between the consumers who have yet to purchase and the individuals who already have, by a distribution fp k g where a fraction p k of the consumers who have yet to purchase have k friends. Consumers are initially unaware of both products. Consumers become aware of one or both of the products through their friends. A consumer …nds out about a product if one of their friends purchased that product. Firms compete in prices and we assume that the marginal cost to produce the good is 0.
We assume that the individuals who have already purchased a product are more likely to have purchased from their preferred …rm (the …rm located the shortest distance from them on the circle) and this is the same for both …rms. We denote this probability by > 1 2 , hence the probability of buying from …rm 1 for the individuals for whom x < 
Analysis
We …rst develop a preliminary result describing the symmetric equilibrium price P as a function of the mass of consumers who know about both …rms; the location of these individuals as described by a p.d.f. f (x) and the transportation cost t. Also in any equilibrium, let g (x) be the probability a person at x purchases from …rm 1. We note that a pricing equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist for any choice of our primitives V , t, , and fp k g. Also for some parameters, the equilibrium may be such that some consumers do not purchase from either …rm. We refer the reader to the appendix, where we show that there are parameters such that a pure strategy equilibrium exists and all consumers purchase a product in equilibrium.
We proceed under these conditions. We now present the following result, which …nds the symmetric equilibrium price level as a function of the density of marginal consumers who know about both products and the level of di¤erentiaton and welfare as a function of the pattern of purchases in the population. 6 In the two-…rm case, one could equivalently locate each at either end of a line. However, in the extensions to the model where there are more than two …rms, it will be more natural to locate the …rms symmetrically around a circle. 7 It is relatively straightforward to generate this as a consequence of symmetric price competition in an earlier period. For instance, if individuals are equally likely to be aware of either …rm and at least some individuals are aware of both …rms, > 0. Then the individuals who are aware of both …rms, in a symmetric pricing equilibrium, will choose to purchase from their most preferred …rm. In this case, the fraction of individuals who purchase from their most preferred …rm will be = 1+ 2
:
Proposition 1 The symmetric equilibrium price is
and total welfare W W = V t
Proof. All proofs are contained in the appendix. Welfare is split between producers'surplus P and consumer surplus W P . We note that the only ine¢ ciency in the model is the welfare loss associated with an individual purchasing a product that is not from the …rm located closest to themselves. Of course, the set of individuals who know about both products and the equilibrium pattern of purchases in the population are endogenous quantities which are in ‡uenced by the social network. The focus of our analysis is on how the social network in ‡uences these quantities and then, through the relationships described in the proposition, to relate these changes to prices and welfare.
We also consider how two metrics, the sensitivity of demand and consumer awareness, are related to welfare. Our consumer awareness metric is the fraction of individuals who are aware of both …rms. A survey of (randomly chosen) consumers would …nd that this fraction of individuals are aware of both products. Our metric of demand sensitivity is the magnitude of the derivative of a …rm's demand with respect to either the own price or the cross price. One may reasonably expect that this quantity is knowable in the region of the pricing equilibrium. This could be found by the …rm at relatively small cost through experimentation, since losses due to small deviations from the pro…t maximizing level are second order. On the other hand it may also be knowable to an outside econometrician in the presence of small idiosyncratic cost shocks. However, estimating this quantity globally for all possible price pairs would require a great deal more variation in prices. In the region of the symmetric equilibrium, the magnitude of the sensitivity of demand for a …rm to its own price and the other …rm's price is given by:
In our model, more information cannot make an individual worse o¤; similarly, if an individual responds to a price change, then the individual is aware of both products and is making an e¢ cient choice. A naive interpretation of the aforementioned metrics may then conclude that settings where consumer awareness is greater and/or demand is more responsive to price changes are environments where consumer choices are more e¢ cient. One of the questions we answer in this paper is whether this approach is valid when changes in these metrics arise from di¤erent properties of the social network driving the di¤usion of information.
Random Connections
Our …rst set of results concerns how changes in the social network fp k g a¤ect prices and welfare. Empirically, Leskovec, Adamic and Huberman (2007) and Keller, Fay and Berry (2007) …nd that the average and dispersion in the amount of WOM vary greatly across product categories. An area of interest is then how the average and dispersion in the number of friends in the social network a¤ect prices and welfare, and also whether these changes generate a positive correlation between our metrics of e¢ ciency and welfare. We assume that the friends of a consumer are randomly drawn. Importantly, this means that, independent of an individual's location x, a friend is equally likely to have purchased either …rm's product. Under this assumption, the mass of customers who know about both products is:
and only about each …rm's product:
for both …rms 1 and 2. Finally, given our assumption of random connections, the probability of being aware of both products is independent of an individual's location and so f (x) = 1 for all x. Hence, the symmetric equilbrium prices in period 2 as a function of the social network are
The probability that an individual at a distance x purchases from the representative …rm is
We now present the comparative statics of changes to the social network on the outcome.
Proposition 2 Consider two distributions fp 0 k g ; fp 00 k g, then prices are lower and welfare is higher under fp 0 k g if fp 0 k g FOSD fp 00 k g or if fp 00 k g is a mean preserving of fp 0 k g.
When the social network has more connections, it is more likely that individuals …nd out about both products. This makes each …rm's demand more elastic to its price (resulting in lower prices) and reduces the number of consumers who choose the "wrong"product. The probability of being aware of both products is a concave function in the number of friends; hence, a mean preserving spread reduces the sensitivity of a …rm's demand to its price and leads to higher prices in equilibrium. In the case of random connections, welfare is determined by the fraction of consumers who know about one …rm. These individuals are uniformly distributed across the population, so half will purchase from the "wrong" …rm. Hence, welfare is higher when there are more elastic consumers and prices are lower.
Proposition 3 Consider two distributions fp 0 k g ; fp 00 k g then greater awareness or more sensitive demand under one distribution than the other implies higher welfare.
We …nd that changes to the distribution of friendships generate a positive relationship between the two metrics and welfare. Thus, in settings where di¤erences in the distribution of friendships within a population are responsible for di¤erent outcomes, our metrics will be positively correlated with welfare. Here the intuitive relationship between our metrics and welfare exists, and their naive use will correctly distinguish between settings that are more or less informationally e¢ cient.
Homophily
A commonly observed characteristic of social networks is the propensity for individuals to be friends with people who are similar to themselves. 8 In this section, we consider how the propensity for individuals to be friends with people who are located closer to them in product space a¤ects prices and welfare. We …nd that this tendency improves welfare. In the two-…rm case, homophily has no e¤ect on prices; however in an extension to three …rms, the e¤ect is ambiguous. Increased levels of homophily have two e¤ects on the distribution of information in the population. First, it tends to restrict the variety of information that an individual receives, leading to a small population of consumers who are aware of both products. Second, individuals located close by in product space will, on average, tend to purchase the product which is closest to their location. This means that the information they pass on is most useful for people who are similar to themselves.
We will assume that an individual located at x draws their friends from a uniform p.d.f. over individuals located within a distance < 1 2 of themselves with probability and draws their friends uniformly from the population with probability 1
. Here the parameter increases the degree of homophily and decreases the degree of homophily. The following proposition describes the e¤ect of the parameter on prices and welfare.
Proposition 4
As the amount of homophily increases, prices and producer pro…ts are constant; consumer and total welfare are increasing; and the fraction of the population that know about both …rms decreases.
Homophily has no e¤ect on prices and producer pro…ts. The reason is that introducing homophily does not change the density of consumers, who are aware of both products, at the location of the marginal consumer x = 1 2 . Under our assumption that the friends who have already purchased a product are more likely to buy from the …rm located closest to them. A consumer located closer to …rm one is more likely to have friends that purchase from …rm one, and a consumer located close to …rm two is more likely to have friends that purchase from …rm two. However, the marginal consumers are equally likely to have friends who purchased from either …rm, as they do when connections are purely random. Hence, homophily does not change the marginal consumer's propensity to know about both …rms, and therefore has no e¤ect on the prices that …rms charge in equilibrium. Homophily does improve welfare because it changes the propensity of individuals located closer to either of the …rms to learn about that …rm from their friends. This reduces the fraction of individuals in the population who purchase from the …rm located further away from themselves, thereby improving welfare.
Proposition 5 Consider two networks with the same distribution of friendships fp k g but di¤ ering levels of homophily 0 > 00 then, in the network with greater homophily, welfare is greater but awareness is lower and the sensitivity of demand is the same.
The result highlights a challenge of using product awareness surveys for identifying markets which are more or less informationally e¢ cient. As one increases the amount of homophily, consumer choices and welfare improve, but the fraction of the population which is aware of both …rms decreases. Thus, a survey of consumers' awareness of products would reveal that individuals are on average less aware of the available products, despite consumers making better decisions. Here, the naive use of consumer awareness will lead one to draw the wrong conclusion.
We believe that this is the …rst paper to highlight the bene…cial role of homophily for information di¤usion in product markets. 9 The key insight is that homophily ensures that people are more likely to …nd out the "right" information for making their choice, as opposed to more information. The key to this property is that individuals who are similar to oneself are more likely to purchase from the …rm which is the closer of the two. Hence, homophily improves the relevance of the information that an individual receives by biasing an individual's information acquisition, from their friends, towards information that is more valuable.
Example of homophily with 3 …rms
It should be relatively straightforward to see that the welfare-improving e¤ect of homophily extends readily to the case with many …rms. Earlier we saw that prices were independent of the level of homophily in the two-…rm case. This is no longer true when there are three …rms. Here we consider an example with three …rms, where increasing the amount of homophily may increase or decrease the equilibrium prices. However, the independence of prices and sensitivity of demand to homophily is a property which is speci…c to the case of two …rms. We present an example with 3 …rms to illustrate that homophily may increase or decrease prices (make demand less or more sensitive to prices).
In a similar way to before, we assume that an individual located at x draws their friends from a uniform p.d.f. over individuals located within a distance < 1 3 of themselves with probability and draws their friends uniformly from the population with probability 1
. Once more, our focus is on the parameter that increases the degree of homophily.
We will assume that a symmetric equilibrium is played in the …rst period and the likelihood that a consumer located a distance x purchases from the m'th preferred …rm is given by m , where m is decreasing in m and P m m = 1. We will consider two di¤erent cases for m . In one case, we assume that 1 = In the other case, we assume simply that 1 = 1 and 2 = 3 = 0:
Proposition 6 When 1 = Here we see that the in ‡uence of homophily on prices is ambiguous, in that the relative likelihood of individuals purchasing from their mth preferred …rm determines whether or not prices increase or decrease as homophily is increased. When there are more than two …rms, homophily has two competing e¤ects on the density of marginal consumers, those who are located equidistant from two …rms. In the presence of more than two …rms, there are consumers who would strictly prefer one …rm's product but are located equidistant from the other two …rms. These consumers may be nonetheless marginal if they are unaware of their most preferred …rm. Homophily reduces the mass of these individuals because it increases the probability that consumers at this location …nd out about their most prefered …rm. On the other hand homophily increases the probability that individuals who are indi¤erent between their two most preferred …rms …nd out about both, since it reduces the probability of …nding out about their least preferred …rm. The former e¤ect is the strongest in the case where 1 = 1 and 2 = 3 = 0. Whereas the second e¤ect is greater when 1 = 
Clustering
A commonly observed characteristic of social networks is the prevalence of clusters of individuals who are all friends with one another. An early study of this is Rapoport (1948) . More recently, Watts and Strogatz (1998) have drawn attention to this characteristic of social networks. The simplest example is a triad where three individuals are all friends. In this section, we introduce clustering into the model to contrast the connectivity e¤ects of clustering to those of homophily. One often considers the prevalence of shared friends and cliques in a population to be re‡ective of a homophily-driven friendship selection process whereby individuals with similar preferences/interests/characteristics self-select into clubs, groups and socializing environments where they meet one another. Here we draw out the distinction between the competitive e¤ect of short closed loops of friendships in a network compared to that generated by homophily. We show that short closed loops tend to reduce competitive forces because these links have a higher probability of transmitting redundant information. Unlike homophily, clustering does not improve the type of information an individual receives. Our metrics of e¢ ciency are positively correlated with e¢ ciency when the amount of clustering increases. We introduce a relationship between individuals born in period 2. We assume that each individual has one friend amongst the individuals born in period 2. We assume that each period 2 individual …rst observes the decisions taken by their friends in period 1 and then communicates their current preferred product to their friend in period 2. After exchanging information, consumers in period 2 make their purchase decision. This may be di¤erent from the information they communicated if their friend from period 2 informs them about a product which they prefer. We consider two settings, one where the friend is selected uniformly from the population, such that the probability of an individual forming a triad is in…nitesimal, and another setting where the individual shares a friend in common from the …rst period.
In a setting without clustering, the probability of an individual from period 2 communicating that they prefer to purchase from one or the other of the …rms is independent of the information of an individual. Hence, it is equivalent to our earlier analysis in section 4.1:
In the presence of clustering, the probability that an individual communicates that they prefer to purchase from one or another of the …rms is not independent of the information of the friend. The probability that an individual only learns about a given …rm from their friends in period 1 is term is the probability that the k 1 individuals who are di¤erent friends from period 1 also purchase from the same …rm and
k 1 is the probability that, in the event this is not true, the individual prefers this …rm. Hence the probability of knowing about both products is:
Proposition 7 Prices are higher and welfare, awareness and demand sensitivity are lower in a network with clustering compared to an otherwise identical network without clustering.
These results follow from two observations. First, in a network with clustering, the fraction of individuals who know about both products (equation 7) is less than the fraction in a network absent clustering (equation 6). Second, for an individual, the location and number of their friends are independent of their own location. This results in the location of individuals who know about both …rms being uniformly distributed across locations. These two observations imply that prices are given by P = t and hence P N C < P C . The likelihood of purchasing from one's most preferred …rm increases in ; hence welfare is increasing in and welfare under clustering is lower than no clustering, W N C > W C . Finally, our metrics of e¢ ciency, awareness and the demand sensitivity t move in a way that is positively correlated with welfare, so a naive interpretation of these metrics will draw the correct conclusion regarding welfare.
We can contrast these results with those of the homophily section. One of the reasons to contrast these results is that some processes of network formation may plausibly generate homophily and clustering concurrently. For instance, if individuals form friendships by meeting in small groups based on mutual interests, then we may expect a high propensity for clustering (because the groups are small) and homophily (because individuals self-select into groups based on interests). Our results show that this process will have competing e¤ects on welfare, and it is unclear how our metrics relate to welfare in this setting without understanding the network formation process in greater detail.
Correlated connectedness and valuation
For some product categories, a consumer's preferences for the products and their number of friends may be correlated. For instance, individuals who are predominantly classical music listeners or predominantly country music listeners may have more or less friends on average than individuals who are similarly interested in both genres. Alternatively, individuals located closer to one …rm may have more friends than those located closer to a competing …rm. For example, individuals who have a strong preference for the graphic design characteristics of a product may have more or less friends than individuals with weak preferences for this characteristic. In this section, we consider both of these types of correlation; individuals located closer to one …rm have more friends than individuals located a similar distance from the other …rm, and individuals who are a similar distance from both …rms have more or less friends than indiviuduals located close to one or the other of the …rms.
We note that the mass of consumers in the population, who are aware of both products, is independent of any correlation between an individual's location and their number of friends. The distribution of locations within the population depends on any correlation between number of friends and location since:
We note that if consumers at a given location have more friends, holding the population distribution constant, this increases the density at this point. For our purposes, it is useful to describe any correlation between location and number of friendships through its in ‡uence on the distribution f (x).
Symmetric Correlation
In this section, we show that, as marginal consumers have more friends at the expense of infra-marginal consumers, then prices, the producer's pro…ts and overall welfare decrease. The e¤ect on consumers is ambiguous, and there is a trade-o¤ between increasing price competition through marginal consumers being better connected and increasing the e¢ ciency of matching consumers to products. In this section, we contrast two distributions f 0 and f 00 . We place the following assumption on these two distributions:
Assumption 1 f 0 and f 00 are symmetric about x = 1 2 and f 0 (x) …rst order stochastically dominates f 00 (x) for x 2 0; We continue with the understanding that increasing the connectivity of individuals closer to 1 2 and decreasing the connectivity of individuals further away induces a distribution such as f 00 which is FOSD by f 0 . Thus, a distribution such as f 0 exhibits greater correlation between an individual's number of friends and proximity to their most preferred …rm. The following proposition characterizes the e¤ect of this correlation on welfare and pricing.
Proposition 8 Consider f 0 and f 00 which satisfy assumption 1, then prices, producer pro…ts and welfare will be lower under f 0 than f 00 .
An individual with more friends is more likely to be aware of both …rms. When marginally located individuals, people who are located equidistant from either …rm in our symmetric equilibrium, are more likely to have more friendships, then demand will be more sensitive to price, since these individuals are more likely to know about both …rms. In equilibrium, this results in a lower price level. From a welfare perspective, the same mass of individuals make a mistake by choosing a product which is not their most preferred; however, the expected welfare loss under f 0 is greater than under f 00 because the expected distance of these individuals from their preferred …rm is larger. The losses associated with marginal individuals choosing the "wrong"…rm are relatively small compared (zero for an individual at a distance x = 1 2 ) to the losses associated with consumers located close to either one of the …rms making the "wrong" choice (t for an individual located a distance x = 0 from their preferred …rm). Hence, a symmetric correlation which increases the connectivity of marginal individuals while decreasing the connectivity of individuals closer to the …rms will tend to reduce welfare because the identity of the individuals making the mistake is now di¤erent.
We also …nd that our metrics of welfare do not move in an intuitive manner under this type of correlation. Awareness is unrelated to any correlation between connectedness and location, whereas demand sensitivity is negatively related to welfare.
Proposition 9
Consider f 0 and f 00 which satisfy assumption 1, then awareness is the same under f 0 and f 00 ; and demand sensitivity is lower under f 0 than f 00 .
A correlation between an individual's location and their number of friends does not a¤ect the fraction of individuals who become aware of both …rms. However, it does a¤ect where those individuals are likely to be located. A correlation which shifts friendships towards marginal consumers will tend to make demand more sensitive to prices. As we discussed above, this type of change lowers prices but is bad for welfare, since the ine¢ ciency associated with a marginal individual making a mistake is small relative to someone with a preference for one or other of the …rms.
The overall e¤ect on consumer welfare depends on the nature of the change to the distribution of friendships. Reallocating friendships from a small number of people to marginal consumers reduces prices for everyone but only induces an ine¢ ciency for a small number of people. The following example illustrates that there is a robust sense that these sorts of changes will tend to improve consumer welfare.
Example of robustness of improving consumer welfare. We consider an example of shifting some friendships from individuals located close to each of the …rms to individuals located closer to the marginal consumer. There are two countervailing e¤ects of such a change on consumer welfare. The welfare loss (from choosing the "wrong" …rm) to a person located close to one of the …rms is greater than the loss for people who are located equidistant from each. This type of ine¢ ciency is increased by shifting friendships away from individuals located close to one of the …rms. However, the bene…t of increasing the connectivity of marginal consumers is that it makes these individuals more sensitive to the prices chosen by the …rms. This increases price competition between the …rms, resulting in lower prices, which bene…t all consumers.
In this section, we consider a shift of friendships from individuals located close to one or another of the …rms towards the marginal consumers. We …nd that all changes (of the kind we consider) improve consumer welfare. De…ne the following change to the distribution of friendships q k (x) = p k "; q k 1 (x) = p 1 + " for locations x and x 1 where is small, and
Proposition 10 For all values of this change improves consumer surplus.
We see that redistributing friendships towards individuals closer to the marginal consumer improves welfare. Even in the most extreme case in our example, whereby friendships are reduced for individuals in a small neighborhood around both friends and are then redistributed uniformly across the rest of the population, this is suf…cient to improve consumer welfare. The reason is that the price change induced by this change is experienced by all consumers. Even though the friendships are evenly distributed across all individuals x 1 the improvement in the elasticity of the marginal consumers improves prices for consumers su¢ ciently to o¤set the welfare associated with higher average travel costs. Finally, note that moving some friendships to individuals closer to the marginal consumer only changes prices if the individuals immediately around the marginal consumer receive some of the friendships. Otherwise, prices are unchanged and consumer welfare becomes unambiguously worse.
Asymmetric Correlation
In this subsection, we consider a correlation whereby one …rm is located closer to individuals with more friends than the other …rm. We again model this correlation by placing conditions on the distribution of individuals who are aware of both …rms. Without loss of generality, we assume that the …rm located close to individuals with more friends is the representative …rm. We capture this correlation by assuming that the density f (x) is strictly decreasing in x. The following proposition characterizes the properties of a pricing equilibrium in a market where individuals located closer to one …rm are better connected than the other.
Proposition 11 Firm 1 prices higher than …rm 2, P 1 > P 2 , and obtains a larger market share.
The …rms choose di¤erent prices in equilibrium. An equal fraction of individuals …nd out about each product; however, the distribution of individuals who …nd out about both are located closer to the representative …rm. This results in the representative …rm setting a higher price but nonetheless capturing a greater share of these individuals. The representative …rm thus makes a higher pro…t from being located closer to individuals with more friends. We next consider the welfare e¤ects of this correlation between location and number of friends relative to a network with no correlation.
Proposition 12 Suppose
f (x)+f (1 x) 2 = 1 and f (x) > f (1 x) for all x 2 0; 1 2 , then welfare is lower than in a population where connectedness is independent of location.
This proposition highlights a source of ine¢ ciency from the asymmetric correlation between connectedness and location. The asymmetry results in individuals closer to the representative …rm being more likely to be aware of both …rms. It is this asymmetry in prices which results in some consumers, who are aware of both …rms, nonetheless choosing the …rm further away from themselves because of the lower price. In our model, this corresponds to some individuals located x < 1 2 amongst the individuals who are aware of both …rms purchasing from …rm 2 because of the price di¤erence.
Extension to Generalized Number of Firms
Our …rst step is to characterize the demand curve facing a representative …rm D (P; fp k g). This is more challenging than the case where everyone is perfectly aware of all products because …rms may sell to consumers located far away on the circle. This occurs when these individuals have not found out about any alternative …rms located closer to themselves. This means competition is not localized, as in the Salop (1979) model, but is closer to the model of advertising with di¤erentiated products as presented in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) . We again assume that we are in the parameter range where a symmetric pure strategy pricing equilibrium exists. We also return to the case where friendships are independent of an individuals location x.
We begin by characterizing the behavior of a representative …rm. In doing so, we assume that the remaining …rms are playing the symmetric equilibrium with price level P and characterize the demand for the …rm as a function of its own price. Assume that the circumference of the circle is now 1. The cuto¤ for the indi¤erent consumer for whom the representative …rm is their m'th preferred …rm is:
Counting consumers on both sides of the representative …rm, the mass of consumers in each group is:
Denote the probability of selling to consumers in each group by m then
We can now write demand as
It is then straightforward to show that the markup in the symmetric equilibrium is given by
Proposition 13 The comparative statics in Proposition 2 continue to hold in the case of a generalized number of …rms.
The denominator in equation 13 is increasing and concave in k, as is the denominator in equation 4 for the two-…rm case. This is the key property of the pricing relationship which generates the comparative statics in Proposition 2 and continues to hold here. Next we consider the comparative statics of the equilibrium with respect to the number of …rms in the market.
Proposition 14
Prices and pro…ts are decreasing in the number of …rms.
As we might expect, the market becomes increasingly competitive and prices and pro…ts go down, as we increase the number of …rms. However, as we see in the next proposition, the network does impose a limit on the extent to which these competitive forces may act.
Proposition 15
In the limit of a large number of …rms, prices are strictly greater than marginal costs, in particular prices approach c + Here, even as the number of …rms increases, there is a strictly positive lower bound on the markups charged by …rms. The social network is the conduit for information and it determines the intensity of price competition between …rms. The limit as the number of …rms becomes large is the markup that would be achieved in the fully informed model with E [k] symmetric …rms located equidistant around the circle.
The …nal proposition in this section considers the e¢ ciency of free entry into the market. We assume that …rms have …xed costs F and that free entry will dissipate pro…ts such that the number of …rms that enter the market n F E is the largest integer satisfying: t
Firm entry improves welfare by reducing the average travel cost incurred by consumers. The welfare maximizing number of …rms n W M is the largest integer satisfying:
where x (n) is the expected travel cost of a consumer when there are n …rms. Our proposition shows that, ine¢ ciently, too many …rms enter the market as the …xed costs of entry become small.
Proposition 16
For small …xed costs, F < F free entry results in more …rms than the welfare maximizing number of …rms,
There is excess entry in our model as the number of …rms in the market increases. The presence of a "business stealing" e¤ect leading to excessive entry is a common …nding in industrial organization models of this kind (see, for instance, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and Mankiw and Whinston (1986) ). We have con…rmed here that this property carries over to our model under social learning.
Conclusion
We have introduced social learning into a workhorse model of product di¤erentia-tion. The model is simple, yet permits a variety of comparative statics of network characteristics on outcomes such as pricing and welfare. In our analysis, we …nd that features of the social network such as homophily and correlations between an individual's valuations and number of friends have non-obvious e¤ects on pricing and welfare. For instance, changing the amount of homophily may improve welfare and have little e¤ect on the price; changing the correlation may reduce prices but nonetheless make welfare worse. These features also highlight some of the challenges of using simple metrics, such as brand awareness surveys and estimates of demand sensitivity, to infer the informational e¢ ciency of markets. Proof. The cuto¤ type is given by:
whereby all x b x purchase from …rm 1 and x b x purchase from …rm 2. Using this to write …rm 1's pro…ts
impose symmetry P = P 1 = P 2 , and assume symmetry of f (x) around x = 1 2 and that it is di¤erential almost everywhere.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Both e¤ects come through the change in :
The term 1 2 k 1 is decreasing in k and is convex, hence a FOSD change reduces and a mean preserving spread increases . The result is then immediate when we note that for a uniform f (x) = 1 the equilibrium price level is P = t ; welfare is determined by the fraction of individuals who choose the product that is furthest away from their location, which is 1 2 .
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. In the case of random connections awareness is
and demand sensitivity is
The the distribution of friendships in ‡uences each through the term term
Thus each move together in this case. Note that welfare
is increasing in g (x) for x < 
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. For a consumer located at x; we denote the probability that a given friend purchased from …rm 1 by 1 (x); this is
x + for The probability (x; k) of a person at x with k friends knowing about both products is (x; k) = 1
hence the probability of a randomly chosen individual at x is
2 is given by
We can substitute this in to …nd equilibrium prices:
which is independent of . Demand for each product is also constant at 1 2 in the symmetric equilibrium, so producers' pro…ts are unchanged. Consumer welfare is therefore inversely related to the fraction of buyers who purchase the product from the closest …rm. This is
We see that consumer welfare is decreasing by noting that 1 (x) is increasing in for x 
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Proposition 4 shows that welfare increases in the amount of homophily.
Hence it su¢ ces to show that awareness is decreasing in the level of homophily and demand sensitivity is independent of it. We saw in the previous proof that
and also that 1 (x) is increasing in . Hence awareness is decreasing as homophily is increasing. The sensitivity of demand is given by
and as we saw in the previous proof f
of the level of homophily.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. In period 2, we can derive the sets of individuals for whom a representative …rm is the mth preferred …rm. The cuto¤ types are determined as:
We can write demand as
where the functions g m are the probability at a location x that a person buys from their m 0 th preferred …rm. The derivative of demand with respect to price is
hence the markup in the symmetric equilibrium is given by
now evaluating the terms g m (x m ) ; g m (x m+1 )
Putting this together
Now taking the derivative wrt
gathering terms and simplifying 
This is positive, hence prices are decreasing in . Alternatively, substituting in
gives:
which is negative, hence prices are increasing in .
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. It is immediate that C < N C from equations 6 and 7. Prices are given by
hence it is also immediate that prices are lower and welfare greater without clustering. Finally demand sensitivity is 2t which is greater without clustering than with.
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Prices are given by P = : By assumption, f 0 1 2 > f 00 1 2 and note that is the same under f 0 and f 00 hence prices are lower under f 0 ; producers always sell to 1 2 mass of consumers in the symmetric equilibrium, so pro…ts also decrease. Welfare is determined by the welfare loss from individuals buying from the …rm located further away. This is given by
where R 1 2 0 xf (x) dx is larger for f 0 than f 00 hence the welfare loss is greater.
Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. It is immediate that awareness is independent of the correlation structure. Demand sensitivity is given by f
Now f 0 is …rst order stochastically dominated by f 00 and
0 f 00 (x) dx hence f 00 1 2 < f 0 1 2 . Therefore demand sensitivity is higher under f 0 than f 00
Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. At the locations x : x and x 1 the the probability that someone only …nds out about the "wrong"…rm changes from The price e¤ect occurs through the change to P =
k 1 . Now, taking the derivative with respect to "
so the bene…ts to consumers are approximately
these outweigh the ine¢ ciency provided
which is true, since the upper bound for is 1 2 .
Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. The cuto¤ type is given by:
whereby all x b x purchase from …rm 1 and x b x purchase from …rm 2. Using this to write …rm 1's pro…ts:
unlike earlier, f (x) is not symmetric around Similarly, we can …nd for …rm 2
2 the left-hand side is positive and the right-hand side is negative, hence b x < 1 2 . This implies that P 1 > P 2 and F (b x ) > There is an ine¢ ciency due to the asymmetric pricing amongst the elastic consumers because some consumers with x < 1 2 incur the additional travel costs to purchase from …rm 2.
Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. The probability of purchasing from the representative …rm is: is the location of the marginal consumers. Let g A and g I be the probabilities for the asymmetric correlation and independent networks respectively. The di¤erence in welfare between the two is:
where b x A is the location of the marginal consumer in the asymmetric case.
Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. This follows immediately after noting that 1 n 1 n k 1 n k is an increasing and concave function of k.
Proof of Proposition 14
Proof. We show that prices are decreasing in the number of …rms dP dn < 0. This then immediately implies that pro…ts will also be decreasing. Prices are given by We conclude by observing that the expression monotonically decreases and is thus always positive.
@ @n
> 0 for all n 2; k 2
Proof of Proposition 15
Proof. We have
symmetry of the problem ensures that if the second order condition holds for …rm 1, then it is also satis…ed for …rm 2. We show that there are parameters such that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists for the case where f is a uniform distribution. We then note that pro…ts are continuous in f; hence for f su¢ ciently close to a uniform distribution, and satisfying our symmetry and smoothness assumptions, then a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium will continue to exist.
First we will assume 1 + 1 < V t t
, where we note that = 1 P k p k 1 2 k 1 and hence that this condition implies
We may always satisfy this condition with a su¢ ciently connected network.
The pro…t when f is a uniform distribution is There are two cases of prices P 1 t 1 + 1 ; P 1 = V t or P 1 = V 2 ; other than P 1 = t ; which may be optimal. The conditions for neither to be optimal are:
In each case, pro…ts are:
V t
These are not better than the symmetric equilibrium pro…ts provided (V t) 
Rearranging gives
Combining conditions in equations 16 and 17, the following conditions are su¢ cient:
1 + 1 V t t
()
and t V 2 for instance, = 1 2 ; t = V 4:5 satis…es the above conditions. We now note that pro…ts are continuous in f; hence for f su¢ ciently close to a uniform distribution, and satisfying our symmetry and smoothness assumptions, then a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium will continue to exist for the cases of homophily and symmetric correlation for f close enough to uniform.
